The Court of Appeals in IN RE J.W. (DEL-1326-12) decided on October 9, 2014, vacated and reversed J.W.’s conviction for “possession of implements of crime.”

J.W. and another juvenile were seen near a Vespa scooter chained to a fence. J.W. was wearing a black ski pants with a black ski mask on top of his head loitering around the scooter while carrying a two foot-long bolt cutter. He was arrested and charged with — a statute that prohibits the possession of “any instrument, tool, or implement for picking locks or pockets, with the intent to use such instrument, tool, or implement to commit a crime” — and   found involved at trial for possessing the implements of crime.

The Court of Appeals focused and analyzed the strict statutory language to determine whether J.W. is culpable under the provision. In that, the Court expounded: in examining the statutory language, it is axiomatic that the words of the statute should be construed according to their ordinary sense and with the meaning commonly attributed to them.

The Court compared the current language with the former statutory language which was broad and defined implements of crime as any instrument which are usually employed or reasonably may be employed in commission of any crime.

The Court reasoned that bolt cutters can be used to sever the chain, which secured the Vespa but it would not qualify as an instrument for –picking a lock – as required by the current statute. Picking a lock requires skill and finesse not brute force of a bolt cutter.

The government argued ineffectively on appeal that lock-picking encompasses any manner of opening a lock with an instrument other than a proper key.

In applying a strict statutory interpretations rather than a broad definition, the Court articulated:

But a penal statute must “define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited … and we doubt that an ordinary citizen would anticipate that the term “picking locks” encompasses every conceivable method of opening (including breaking or destroying) a lock without the key. We therefore conclude that, in this context, the term “picking a lock” means “the opening of the lock without the use of the original or duplicate keys and without damage to the lock.”

Thus as a bolt cutter cannot quality as a lock- picking tool then there was insufficient evidence to sustain J.W.’s adjudication.

The Court in rendering this opinion acknowledged that the title of the statute “possession of implements of crime” its all encompassing but it is the text of the statute that is controlling in determining the elements of the crime charged and the scope of the statute. Here the text and plain interpretation of the language ruled out a bolt cutter as a lock picking device or tool and thus the conviction should be reversed.

Although this was not mentioned or noted in the Court’s opinion, the fact that J.W. was not seen engaging the lock or the chain of the Vespa or actually using the bolt cutter on the chain or the lock was significant in not providing a strong factual foundation for the crime charged. A different set of facts might have rendered affirming the conviction rather than the reversal issued.