The DC Court of Appeals in IN RE PETITION OF S.L.G & S.E.G.; D.A. (No. 14-FS-73) decided on March 5, 2015; once again reiterated and cemented the presumption of parental fitness in a contested adoption proceedings. The case is significant as the Court defined and expanded on the definition of “fitness” and outlined the legal criteria the trial court must use in rendering an opinion.
The appellant biological mother contested the adoption petition by the foster family S.E.G. and S.L.G. Evidence established that the child was in the foster home for over two years, well integrated in the home and bonded to the foster parents and family. The foster family also according to testimony met the child’s mental and developmental needs, by all account and petitioner were fit and proper to adopt the child.
The biological mother on the other hand exhibited mental health and behavioral issues that raised concerns as to her ability to safely care for the child. The mother also struggled with sobriety and was not compliant with services. She also consistently made poor decisions, which could comprise safety of the child.
The appellant challenged the trial court ruling essentially on two grounds: that the court made direct comparison between her and the foster parents as they were equipoise; and the court did not consider or factor the possibility of her becoming a fit parent in a foreseeable future.
Although the trial court outlined and methodically summarized evidence in favor of granting the adoption petition – the court did not: 1) make express findings that the appellate was not fit; 2) that maintaining the biological link would be endangering or be detrimental to the child; and that 3) the legal presumption of parental fitness has been rebutted.
The Court reiterated the over arching principle that there is a legal presumption that the child’s best interests would be served in care of their biological parents – unless the parental unfitness has been demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence.
The strong legal presumption as stated stems from “the fundamental and constitutionally protected liberty interest” of the parents to care, control and manage their children without state intervention.
The Court broadly defined parental fitness as the parents’ intention and ability to provide for the child’s needs, wellbeing and welfare now or in the near future. Thus the presumption of fitness is not rebutted if a parent is on her way or it is foreseeable that she will become a fit caretaker in a near future.
In narrowing this definition the court provided specifics examples: “if the natural parent is unable or unwilling to meet the child’s critical needs or maintain an appropriate parental relationship with the child, or if placement of the child with the natural parent would endanger the child or be detrimental to the child’s wellbeing, that would mean the parent is unfit to care for that child. Conversely, if the natural parent is able and motivated to meet the child’s fundamental needs and appropriately parent the child (or likely will be able to do so without undue delay because any parental disability has a reasonably close endpoint in sight), and placement with the parent would not otherwise be harmful to the child’s welfare, then the TPR factors weigh in favor of finding the parent fit and applying the presumption.” Moreover that “[t]he fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child does not evaporate simply because they have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the State.”
Accordingly, the Court ruled that the trial court findings were incomplete and inconclusive as to parental fitness and remanded the case. The trial court failed to recognize or highlight the presumption in favor of parental fitness and to highlight the evidence establishing parental unfitness by clear and convincing evidence. It is not sufficient that the appellant was less capable or that the petitioner was more appropriate care taker – there has to be salient, specific evidence on the record of parental unfitness in order to rebut the constitutionally protected presumption in favor of parental fitness. The trial court’s findings must be “supported by substantial reasoning drawn from a firm factual foundation in the record.”
This case is significant as it establishes with force and clarity that the biological parents do not stand equal with adoption petitioners in a contested adoption proceeding. The biological parents have a fundamentally, and constitutionally protected right to raise and care for their children whereas the adoption petitioners do not – and thus the trial court analysis must articulate and recognize and properly consider that important distinguishing right in rendering a decision.