The Court of Appeals in MACKLIN v. JOHNSON, remarkably addressed whether significant homemaker services by one spouse can be considered as a legal contribution in the equitable distribution of property calculation.

In short, the Court concluded that substantial homemaker services are a permissible basis for granting a spouse an equitable interest in the other’s separately-held real property.

Factually, husband purchased his home approximately two years before marriage and kept the title under his own name and after a ten year marriage.  Parties had four children during the marriage and wife’s contribution during that period was essentially homemaker services, maintaining the home, raising the children while husband went to work.

The court awarded wife a 40% equitable interest in the home.  The trial court reasoning was that essentially all of the equity of the home was accrued during the marriage and based on an equitable distribution among parties – she was entitled to that percentage.

Husband argued on appeal that non-financial homemaker contributions are not an appropriate basis to award an equitable interest in separately-held property.  That, homemaker services were not substantial or tangible and that the trial court erroneously failed to deduct his pre-marital equity in the home before an equitable distribution.

The Court of Appeals reaffirmed that is permissible to confer an equitable interest in one spouse in property owned by the other upon dissolution of the marriage, where some right or element of ownership, legal or equitable could be found in the spouse who did not hold title.  Moreover, the courts have broad discretion in granting a non-purchasing spouses an equitable interest in separately-owned property.

Moreover, as long as there are substantial contributions to the home — sole and separate ownership does not preclude a court from encumbering a property with an equitable lien in the other spouse’s favor.

The Court further held that as a matter of first impression that substantial homemaker services can indeed entitle a spouse to an equitable interest in real property purchased by the other spouse before the marriage and used as the family home.

Justifiably, one spouse’s work in caring for the home and children enables the other to earn money to support the family including the money necessary to pay any existing mortgage on the property and that is deemed substantial contribution.

Absent these domestic services, the titled spouse would have had less time and/or income to maintain the property, whereas the non- titled spouse would have had more of an opportunity to acquire income to contribute financially.  Moreover, allocating domestic responsibilities  — an inherent feature of marriage is no reason to disregard the value of those responsibilities.

Husband also argued for equal physical custody of the children as a legal presumption, and the court clarified that only joint custody is presumptively in the children’s best interests in the absence of one or more intra- family offenses.

That is, custody arrangement constitutes joint physical custody so long as it involves some sort of shared custody, such as primary physical custody awarded to one parent and visitation rights to another such as here.  That is not tantamount to equal joint custody.

The trial court’s custody order granting the parties shared custody, while awarding one parent primary physical custody and the other visitation, satisfies the definition of joint custody. The trial court thus did not fail to honor the presumption in favor of joint custody. That is exactly what it awarded.

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