The DC Court of Appeals in Bernard v. Bernard, particularly addressed whether an existing tax liability is a factor for the Court to weigh and consider in dispensing marital property in a divorce action.

Generally, in order to distribute marital property in the manner that is equitable, just and reasonable, the trial judge must consider all relevant factors including, but not limited to those enumerated in section 16-910, but also the court must conduct conscientious weighing of all relevant factors, statutory or otherwise, before reaching a conclusion about the proper distribution of property.

Here, Mr. Bernard argued that the trial judge failed to consider his individual tax obligation of some $50,000 in finding him liable for 92% of the marital credit card and joint tax debt and giving him only 50% of the equity in the home.

Each party’s debit obligations are a factor enumerated in § 16-910(b), and are relevant to the court’s allocation of property and marital debt and the tax liability is no exception.

Because the trial judge’s opinion and record does not reveal whether the court properly included and considered the tax lability in distribution of assets, on this issue alone, a remand was necessary for proper inclusion of this particular debt in the equitable, just and reasonable distribution and the legal analysis.

The overall financial disposition of both parties have to be considered in achieving a fair distribution of marital property and tax liability alters the scale of distribution.

The trial court must determine Mr. Bernard’s earning potential compared to Mrs. Bernard’s and whether such is outweighed by the significance of tax liability.  Moreover, the judge may also consider the reasons Mr. Bernard incurred such debt, a personal debt jeopardizing his ability to meet other obligations; and, of course, the judge may insist on better documentation of the tax liability and the totality of the debt in question.

Equitable distribution of assets requires an integrated and comprehensive assessment of full financial landscape of parties including tax obligations and liabilities.

Mr. Bernard also argued on appeal that the judge in awarding alimony failed to address his claim that Mrs. Bernard voluntarily left the household — in short, deserted him.

Even though desertion is no longer considered a legal factor and has a somewhat of an antiquated cast in the era of no-fault divorce, the court should still consider desertion as one of a number of factors to be taken into consideration in determining whether to award alimony, even inferentially or peripherally.

Thus, marital desertion although technically not a barring factor in awarding alimony, it still remains a factor which must be considered in the judgment of what would be a just and proper determination of both whether to award alimony and if so, the amount thereof.

The case was remanded to the trial court:

•  To decide what effect, if any, Mr. Bernard’s tax obligation should have on the distribution of the marital debts and property, as well as alimony, and
•  To decide similarly with respect to the evidence of desertion as bearing on alimony.

Refer to our Washington DC Divorce Lawyer page for more details on this subject.